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Abstract
This paper highlights the dark side of power imbalance regarding its consequences in agri-food supplier–buyer relation-
ships. We report on findings from two studies. The first study is based on a sample of 105 key informants, while study 2 is 
based on a sample of 444 key informants, all from the cocoa agri-food supply market of Ghana. While the first study focuses 
on the antecedents of power imbalance and its consequences, the second study explores the role of cooperatives/collective 
action in minimizing supplier exploitation. Data from these studies were analysed using the partial least squares technique 
(SmartPLS). Analysis of these findings shows switching costs’ impact on power imbalance to be curvilinear, while power 
imbalance has a curvilinear relationship with opportunism. The negative consequences of power imbalance are further 
exacerbated by dependency and the lack of joint action. Furthermore, we found the negative impact of power imbalance on 
financial performance to be stronger for non-cooperative members than for cooperative members, while, counterintuitively, 
we found the positive impact of economic satisfaction on financial performance to be stronger for non-cooperative members 
than for cooperative members.
Keywords Buyer control · Buyer opportunism · Buyer power · Power asymmetry · Supplier exploitation · Unethical 
behaviour
Introduction
Most agri-food systems in emerging and developing econo-
mies are characterized by small suppliers, which are highly 
dependent on much larger buyers and lead firms. These sup-
pliers have high switching costs and are therefore described 
as ‘‘captive’’ (Cox et al., 2000). While it is generally known 
and assumed that power can be misused and can lead to 
exploitation, the topic of unscrupulous and ethically unprin-
cipled buying behaviour has been ignored in academic 
research in general (Schleper et al., 2017). Cases of supplier 
exploitation by firms or their agents have been popular in the 
media. Power imbalance and dependence have been cited 
as causing and fostering supplier exploitative and negative 
behaviours (Abosag et al., 2016; Hingley, 2005b; Schleper 
et al., 2017). The power concept is critical in understanding 
buyer–supplier relationships (Gaski, 1984). In supply chain 
relationships, power is useful for effective coordination, inte-
gration, and goal attainment, such that weaker participants 
in the chain may be predisposed to endure imbalanced rela-
tions so long as there are ample rewards (Hingley, 2005a; 
Maglaras et al., 2015; Nyga et al., 2013). Asymmetries in 
power affect the distribution of outcomes (Hingley, 2005a).
Grandinetti (2017) identified two different types of 
dark sides to business relationships, termed “trap” and 
“secret”. In the first case, the partner who is at a disadvan-
tage is aware of what is going on but nevertheless remains 
trapped in the relationship because of a power imbalance 
and a strong dependence. In the second case, one part-
ner exploits an information asymmetry (a secret) to his 
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own advantage and to the other partner’s disadvantage. 
Our study is focused on the first scenario, where the sup-
plier is aware of what is going on but nevertheless remains 
trapped in the relationship because of a power imbalance 
and a strong dependence. In addition, despite the recent 
widespread use of the term ‘dark side’ in business relation-
ships, little critique of the literature and empirical research 
has been offered (Abosag et al., 2016, p. 5). In response 
to the above, and to fill the knowledge gap, the empiri-
cal focus is notions of power imbalance in a developing 
country, looking at the cocoa raw material market, com-
prising an upstream supply chain marketplace of growers 
with customers who eventually are tiered within devel-
oped marketplaces. Our goal is to highlight the impact of 
power in business relationships regarding the ‘dark side’ 
phenomenon and how it erodes the gains of suppliers in 
agri-food supply chains. The research objectives of this 
study are several. We seek to examine: (1) how depend-
ency and high switching costs in agri-food supplier–buyer 
exchanges influence perceptions of power imbalance; (2) 
the conditions under which power imbalance provide ideal 
situations for unethical behaviours; (3) the consequences 
of power imbalance, opportunistic behaviour and decision 
control; and (4) to provide theoretical contributions, mana-
gerial insights and implications.
The Ghanaian cocoa supply market is the empirical 
context. The paper concerns the relationship between buy-
ing agents, who are intermediaries between cocoa growers 
and the buying firms. Several events have been reported of 
unscrupulous conduct by various buying agents who under-
value sales from cocoa growers (Dadzie et al., 2018). The 
financial loss caused by inaccurate weighing of produce can 
be a source of cognitive distrust (Dadzie et al., 2018). The 
global cocoa-chocolate market is estimated to reach $140 
billion by 2024. Ghana is the second leading exporter of 
cocoa globally (Dadzie et al., 2018; Oomes et al., 2016). 
The national supply market has strong interconnections to 
the global cocoa-chocolate market. The power relations 
in the Ghanaian context are similar to several cocoa-pro-
ducing countries, which strengthens the generalizability of 
our results. The global cocoa-chocolate supply chain is a 
complex network of cocoa growers, traders, exporters, con-
verters/grinders, chocolate manufacturers, and retail chains. 
Based on our findings from a quantitative study administered 
in this industry, we argue that the investment in positive 
elements by businesses alone is not adequate, as business 
partners must protect suppliers against detrimental actions 
and behaviours.
The rest of the article is organized as follows: in the next 
section, we review the literature and present the research 
hypotheses. This is followed by the research methods, 
results, and the discussion. We conclude with the limita-
tions and suggestions for further research.
Literature Review and Research Hypotheses
Dark Side of Business Relationships
No business relationships are absolutely light or dark, but 
instead embody a mix of these two (Abosag et al., 2016). Pre-
vious literature (e.g. Håkansson and Snehota, 1998) empha-
sizes the dark side as deriving from the value of relationships. 
The literature (e.g. Abosag et al., 2016) has identified various 
situations that constitute the dark side, such as relationship 
unrest (Good & Evans, 2001), relationship burdens (Håkans-
son and Snehota, 1998), relationship stress (Holmlund-
Rytkönen & Strandvik, 2005), the adverse sides of business 
relationships (Strandvik & Holmlund, 2008), relational mis-
conduct (Hawkins et al., 2008), detrimental intentions (Liu 
et al., 2014), and exploitative business relationships (Schleper 
et al., 2017).
The concept of a ‘dark side’ to business relationships sug-
gests “‘problems’, ‘challenges’, ‘difficulties’, and ‘drawbacks’ 
related to structural issues … such as size differences, or the 
imbalance of power; processes within business relationships, 
including creativity issues, capability development, changes 
in market dynamics; and outputs, for example, performance, 
competitiveness and satisfaction” (Abosag et al., 2016, p. 
5). The dark side relates to negative business situations (e.g. 
Gaski, 1984; John, 1984). Regarding collaboration in service 
networks, the dark side refers to those aspects of co-creation 
activities that are hidden and include potential risks in busi-
ness interactions (Chowdhury et al., 2016). Resource integra-
tion activities lead to value co-creation; however, particular 
relevance is the co-destruction of value which aligns with the 
dark side of business relationships. This assertion comes from 
the recognition that engaging in value co-creation may not 
always lead to symmetrical value outcome or desirable out-
come (Dong et al., 2008; Chowdhury et al., 2016). Value can 
be co-destroyed when resources are accidentally or intention-
ally misused (Plé & Cáceres, 2010). Moving beyond power 
and dependence in dyadic relationships to a focus on triads and 
the wider network in supply chains, we argue that cooperative 
and joint actions have the potential of limiting the undesir-
able effects of the dark side. This is because even close dyadic 
relationships that seem to be the most stable are vulnerable to 
the dark side phenomenon (Anderson & Jap, 2005). The light 
side implies that positive benefits and desirable outcomes are 
derived from the relationship; it denotes the situation in which 
good relationship quality yields achievable relationship func-
tions and performance (Fang et al., 2011).
Theories of Power
Power is the ability of one channel member (A) to get 
another channel member (B) to do something that it 
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otherwise would not have done (Coughlan et al., 2006; Dahl, 
1957; Gaski, 1984). It refers to the capability of a partner in 
an exchange to induce another partner to change its behav-
iour in favour of the objectives of the partner exerting the 
influence (Wilemon, 1972). The association between power 
and dependence is better understood from Emerson’s (1962) 
theory. We use ‘dependence’ and ‘dependency’ interchange-
ably with the same meaning and intended purpose. Depend-
ency exists between two channel members when the benefits 
derived from their relationship are not available outside it. 
Thus, A’s power over B increases with B’s dependence on 
A. In imbalanced power relationships, the weaker firm is 
highly dependent on a more powerful firm or its agent to 
continue to achieve its goals. Whenever one partner (i.e. the 
principal) depends on another (i.e. the agent) to undertake 
some action on the principal’s behalf, this leads to a prin-
cipal–agent relationship (Eisenhardt, 1989; Fontrodona & 
Sison, 2006). Power and dependence in exchange relation-
ships lead to vulnerability, and the possibility of one partner 
or its agent being opportunistic and unethical. Dependence is 
a function of the greater utility (i.e. value, benefits, satisfac-
tion) that B gets from A and the fewer alternative sources 
of that utility that B can find. It has to do with how easily B 
can replace A. The dependence condition creates a relational 
trap in which the weak partner has no choice but to endure 
the opportunism of the other (Grandinetti, 2017).
To varying extents, firms always depend on their trading 
partner. Early studies on dependence focused on the effects 
for the buyer of its dependence on the supplier, without con-
sidering the supplier’s dependency (e.g. El-Ansary & Stern, 
1972). A few studies have incorporated dependence from the 
perspective of both the buyer and the supplier (Buchanan, 
1992; Geyskens et al., 1996; Kumar et al., 1995). Depend-
ence is defined, in psychology and social psychology, as a 
state in which assistance from others in terms of finance, 
emotion, protection, security or daily care, is expected 
or actively sought (Zhou et al., 2007). In the context of 
buyer–seller relationships and channel studies, dependence 
refers to the extent to which a trade partner provides impor-
tant and critical resources for which there are few alternative 
sources of supply (Buchanan, 1992), or “the degree to which 
the target firm needs to maintain its relationship with the 
source in order to achieve its desired goals” (Kale, 1986, 
p. 390).
Research Hypotheses
Dependence, Power Imbalance and Financial Performance
In asymmetric relationships, the more independent part-
ner dominates the exchange. Balanced relationships refer 
to domination by neither party (Buchanan, 1992). Kumar 
et al. (1995) use the term ‘interdependence asymmetry’, 
defined as the difference between the two partners’ levels 
of dependence. Symmetrical interdependence exists when 
parties are equally dependent on one another. In asymmetric 
interdependence, the independent partner experiences high 
power and might be attempted to exploit it (Geyskens et al., 
1996). Therefore, power imbalances within a buyer–sup-
plier relationship can lead to unproductive partnerships 
(McDonald, 1999) and hence low economic benefits. In most 
buyer–seller relationships, disparities in turnover or values 
of sales and the size of the supplier compared to the buy-
ing company place the supplier in a less powerful exchange 
position. The buying companies are more powerful and have 
the leading role in respect of relationship administration and 
allocation of rewards (Griffith et al., 2006). Furthermore, the 
annual value of total sales from a supplier to a buyer is an 
indication of the economic rewards that the supplier receives 
for the sacrifice of forgoing alternative exchange relation-
ships. Based on the theory review and reasoning proffered 
here, we posit that:
H1a The effect of supplier dependency on power imbalance 
is moderated by transaction/sales volume.
H1b The effect of power imbalance on financial perfor-
mance is moderated by supplier dependency.
Effect of Switching Costs on Power Imbalance
An imbalance of power within the buyer–supplier relation-
ship may lead not only to dissension by the offended partner 
but to a low performance by the aggrieved partner. In such 
situations, the social capital built up within the relation-
ship may deteriorate. Switching costs, defined as the need 
to maintain a relationship due to latent costs that would be 
incurred if that relationship were to end (Scheer et al., 2015), 
is a key variable impacting on dependency and hence per-
formance. Partners’ investment in terms of time, effort, and 
money, along with perceived costs of switching, can con-
tribute to dependency (Emerson, 1962; Scheer et al., 2015) 
and hence high perceptions of power imbalance. Supplier-
perceived relationship value had been found to be negatively 
related to intention to switch, while support for the negative 
association between switching costs and switching intention 
has been supported (Geiger et al., 2012). Dabholkar et al. 
(1994) paper on the dynamics of long-term business-to-busi-
ness exchange relationships suggests that exchange relation-
ships are formed by achieving mutually beneficial outcomes 
from a series of exchange transactions. The authors propose 
a curvilinear relationship between relative power and gains 
(relationship outcomes) at high switching costs levels. Many 
micro and small businesses dealing with the more powerful 
large firms lack the resources to seek alternative business 
relationships. The more difficult it is for, the weaker partner 
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to switch, the more vulnerable partner perceives the power 
differential. The more powerful and dominant firm begins 
the exchange relationship from a power advantage; however, 
as the exchange relationship develops from transactional to 
closer and long-term mutual relationship, power imbalance 
impact diminishes. However, as it becomes more difficult for 
the weaker partner to switch due to high dependency on the 
more powerful partner, the two partner’s power differential 
becomes more obvious temporally. Therefore, we expect a 
U-shaped relationship between switching costs and power 
imbalance. Based on the above argument, we hypothesize 
that in a captive supplier–buyer relationship:
H2a Switching costs are associated with increased power 
imbalance.
H2b The association between switching costs and power 
imbalance could be curvilinear.
Effect of Power Imbalance on Opportunism
The risk of opportunistic behaviour creates uncertainty, 
thereby requiring some level of cooperative effort to 
ensure a successful relationship (Rokkan & Buvik, 2003). 
Opportunism refers to a self-seeking phenomenon char-
acterized by exploitation (John, 1984; Williamson, 1985). 
Numerous examples of opportunistic behaviour have been 
documented. A few examples include salespeople exagger-
ating expenditure reports (Philips, 1982); resellers violat-
ing explicit resale agreements (Dutta et al., 1994); physi-
cians prescribing excessive quantities of expensive drugs 
to patients (The Economist, 1996); and inaccurate weigh-
ing of produce by buying agents (Dadzie et al., 2018). It 
is logical to assume that the power differential between 
trading partners could provide a conducive environment 
for opportunistic and unethical behaviour (Ireland and 
Webb, 2007). A dependence power advantage is one of 
the most cited antecedents of opportunism in the inter-firm 
relationship literature (Grandinetti, 2017; Hawkins et al., 
2008; Tangpong et al., 2015; Wang & Yang, 2013). Previ-
ous studies had shown that opportunism’s association with 
other variables could be curvilinear, for example, oppor-
tunism and performance (Lado et al., 2008), opportun-
ism and goal exceedance (El Meladi et al., 2018), oppor-
tunism and punishment severity (Xiao et al., 2019), and 
opportunism and guanxi (Shen et al., 2019). Drawing on 
the long-term perspective of Dabholkar et al. (1994) and 
the relationship development cycle (Dwyer et al., 1987), 
opportunism is expected to be low at the relationship ini-
tiation stage but, as the relationship develops and power 
relations become obvious, the partner or its agent with 
the higher power could easily use the power advantage to 
exploit the weaker partner. Consequently, we expect an 
inverted U-shaped relationship between power imbalance 
and opportunism. In view of the above deliberations, we 
hypothesize that:
H3a Power imbalance is associated with increased 
opportunism.
H3b The association between power imbalance and oppor-
tunism could be curvilinear.
Effects of Power Imbalance and Opportunism on Financial 
Performance
Power plays an important role in the supply chain, judi-
cious use of power may serve to benefit the power holder 
(Benton & Maloni, 2005). Lavan (2007) suggests that 
cocoa farmers in Ghana do not benefit much economi-
cally from their farm businesses because of their inabil-
ity to organize themselves. The suppliers lack a strong 
voice with the requisite bargaining power to negotiate with 
the state regulator and the buying firms they deal with. 
Hence, it is expected that cooperative marketing mem-
bership could increase the bargaining power of suppliers 
to counteract the disadvantages associated with a power 
imbalance. We define a cooperative as the use of collec-
tive action through participation in a voluntary venture 
by a group of individuals or independent enterprises with 
the aim of achieving benefits through the coordination of 
activities such as logistics, purchasing, and marketing. In 
supplier–buyer relationships, gains accruing to exchange 
partners reflect how profitable the exchange process has 
been regarding performance. Exploitation of the relative 
power of the buying company or its personnel/agent is 
therefore expected to lead to dissatisfaction and reduce 
financial gains for the weaker partner. Small-scale farm 
businesses can collaborate to diminish the influence or 
unscrupulousness of intermediaries and businesses. Meier 
zu Selhausen (2016) suggests that active involvement in 
agricultural marketing and collaborative efforts help less 
dominant suppliers to overcome exploitation. In line with 
the above reasoning, we hypothesize that in a captive sup-
plier–buyer relationship:
H4a Power imbalance is associated with reduced financial 
performance.
H4b The effect of power imbalance on reducing financial 
performance is stronger for non-cooperative members than 
for cooperative members.
H4c Buyer/agent opportunism is associated with reduced 
supplier financial performance.
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Effects of Buyer Control of Price and Quality on Financial 
Performance
Decision control in terms of buyer control has been concep-
tualized as the extent to which the buyer has authority and 
control over supplier decision-making (Buvik & Andersen, 
2015). It refers to centralization of the decision-making 
authority. In this study, buyer control refers to the ability of 
one partner to influence and control the other in relation to 
channel activities. Control as a governance mechanism is 
used to regulate trading and overcome performance meas-
urement complexities linked to mutual dependence (Wil-
liamson, 1985). Supplier dependency on the buyer creates 
power imbalance situations where the shift in power favours 
the buyer. The power differential augments the buyer’s abil-
ity to control the decisions of the supplier (Anderson & 
Weitz, 1989; Emerson, 1962; Joshi, 1998). Price control by 
the power source could lead to low gains for weaker channel 
members (Belaya & Hanf, 2009; Hingley, 2005a; Maglaras 
et al., 2015). However, control of quality through standardi-
zation could lead to beneficial outcomes. The Japanese are 
known for their emphasis on quality, such that suppliers 
of large manufacturers such as Toyota must meet stringent 
quality standards to improve performance. In demanding 
quality improvements from vendors, in many cases compa-
nies will use only suppliers that have passed the expensive 
and time-consuming ISO 9000 certification (Krause et al., 
2007). Based on the above reasoning, we hypothesize that 
in a captive supplier–buyer relationship:
H5a Buyer control of price is associated with reduced finan-
cial performance.
H5b Quality standardization is associated with increased 
financial performance.
H5c The effect of power imbalance on financial perfor-
mance is moderated by quality standardization.
Effect of Economic Satisfaction on Financial Performance
Supplier satisfaction is defined as a supplier’s cognitive and 
affective state of feeling sufficiently rewarded economically 
and psychosocially for the sacrifices undergone in facilitat-
ing the exchange relationship, no matter what power imbal-
ance may exist between the supplier and the buyer (Benton 
& Maloni, 2005). In this study, we consider satisfaction as a 
two-dimensional construct consisting of economic and non-
economic or social satisfaction (Ferro et al., 2016; Geyskens 
& Steenkamp, 2000; Rodriguez et al., 2006). Economic sat-
isfaction refers to a channel member’s evaluation of the eco-
nomic outcomes that result from the relationship, while non-
economic or social satisfaction refers to the psychosocial, 
non-economic aspects of the relationship, in that interac-
tion with the exchange partner is fulfilling, gratifying, 
and characterized by tranquillity (Geyskens et al., 1999). 
Social exchange theory posits that exchange may involve 
both economic and social outcomes. The need for “consist-
ent delivery of economic and psychosocial benefits in each 
transaction” within the exchange process is critical for the 
sustenance of relational exchanges (Dwyer et al., 1987, p. 
25). A supplier that is satisfied economically evaluates the 
relationship as being successful in terms of goal attainment, 
relationship effectiveness and productivity (Geyskens et al., 
1999), including financial results. An exchange partner’s 
perception of being sufficiently rewarded economically is 
key in imbalanced business relationships. The use of collec-
tive action through participation in marketing cooperatives 
is expected to offset asymmetrical power relations and to 
improve the welfare of its members. We hypothesize that in 
a captive supplier–buyer relationship:
H6a Economic satisfaction is associated with increased 
financial performance.
H6b The effect of economic satisfaction on financial per-
formance is stronger for cooperative members than for non-
cooperative members.
Research Methods
Research Setting and Data Collection
The context is the cocoa industry of Ghana. Certain cocoa-
producing countries have a fully liberated local market with 
a free-market system characterized by many private export-
ers. While in others (e.g. Ghana) private, former state mar-
keting monopolies retain substantial control and play ‘coor-
dinative’ role in chain governance (Glavee-Geo, 2019). In 
Ghana, the industry is partially liberated, characterized by 
the participation of private firms and many cocoa growers 
as the main suppliers. The industry regulator is the Ghana 
Cocoa Board (COCOBOD).
We collected primary data from the cocoa growers, 
who were very knowledgeable about the issues at stake. 
The respondents were either farm owners or farm manag-
ers serving as key informants. We based the sampling on 
farms located in the southern part of Ghana according to the 
knowledge of the industry regulator. Approval was sought 
from each informant before each interview. Subsequently, 
primary data were collected through face-to-face inter-
views. In most developing and some emerging countries, 
data collection through mail or email leads to low response 
rates—hence the need for some other innovative means 
of data collection through household interviews. The lead 
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author conducted the interviews for study 1 over a period 
of two weeks and for study 2 a year later for a period of 
five weeks in the cocoa-growing regions of Central, East-
ern, and Ashanti regions of Ghana. The respondents were 
mostly farm owners who were interviewed in their houses 
(sometimes with a farm manager providing corroborative 
information). Study 1 consisted of 105 respondents while 
study 2 consisted of 444 respondents.
Operational Measures
All constructs are based on reflective multi-item scales 
adapted from previously validated scales (see Tables 1 and 
2). The indicators are measured on a seven-point Likert 
scale, with 1 representing the lowest level (strongly disagree) 
and 7 the highest level (strongly agree). Subjective meas-
ures of supplier financial performance are newly formulated, 
while the profitability measure is adapted from Haugland 
et al. (2007). The difficulty in accessing financial data makes 
the use of subjective measures of performance a better proxy 
to evaluate the performance of a supplying firm. The three-
item scale of supplier financial performance is formulated 
with the anchors 1, representing worse performance, and 7, 
representing better performance. Single-item indicators of 
the relative size of the buyer, relationship duration, transac-
tion/sales volume, supplier dependency, switching costs and 
buyer control of price were formulated based on the extant 
literature (e.g. Buvik & Andersen, 2015; Caniels & Gelder-
man, 2007). A single item—‘this buying company ensures 
that the minimum producer price does not vary’—measured 
buyer control of price. Supplier dependency was measured 
with the question ‘how large do you perceive your depend-
ency on this particular buying company compared to other 
buying companies within this district?’ Switching costs 
Table 1  Construct, reliability, average variance extracted, descriptive statistics, loadings, t-values (n = 105)
CR composite reliability, α Cronbach’s alpha, AVE average variance extracted, M mean, SD standard deviation
# Based on 5000 bootstrapping samples: ***significant at p < 0.001, **significant at p < 0.01 (two-tailed test)





With respect to sales volume during the last twelve months…
How large were your sales to this buying company? 5.67 1.58 0.938 23.840***
How large do you perceive cash bonuses paid by this buying company to 
your farm business?





The buying company often undervalues my cocoa beans 4.24 2.13 0.507 2.962**
The buying company often underrates the quality of my cocoa beans 4.29 2.11 0.842 5.939***
The buying company often neglects to correct sales’ errors in my transac-
tions
4.47 2.13 0.801 5.645***
The buying company often weighs my cocoa beans as less than their 
actual weight.
3.78 1.92 0.777 5.786***





Compared to other farm businesses, my farm business has performed 
relatively well during the last six months in the following respects
Profitability 5.86 1.32 0.881 30.787***
Return on investment 5.88 1.26 0.909 37.774***





This buyer makes sure the quality of the cocoa I sell is okay before taking 
possession
5.99 1.05 0.919 8.569***
This buyer takes control of the product for quality inspection 5.96 1.20 0.733 6.629***
This buyer ensures that the quality test is passed 5.93 1.03 0.773 4.865***





My relationship with this buying company is very attractive with respect 
to prompt payment of cash bonuses
5.49 1.65 0.824 14.788***
I am very pleased with my decision to sell to this buyer due to the finan-
cial benefits the company provides my farm business
5.88 1.22 0.837 18.205***
I am very satisfied with the price at which I sell my cocoa to this buying 
company





I am satisfied with dealing with this buying company 5.73 1.57 0.909 11.636***
I would always continue selling to this buying company because of the 
good personal relationship I have with the staff
5.87 1.59 0.810 7.131***
I am always pleased to deal with this buying company 6.10 1.28 0.919 13.212***
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were measured with ‘how much will it cost you if you want 
to replace this buying company with another one in a new 
location?’ The quality standardization item was formulated 
based on buyer control measures by Buvik and Andersen 
(2015). Power imbalance items were adapted from Joshi 
and Stump (1999). In study 1, power imbalance items were 
operationalized based on two main questions: ‘how large 
were your sales to this buying company?’ and ‘how large 
do you perceive the cash bonuses paid by this buying com-
pany to your farm business?’ However, in study 2, we sought 
Table 2  Construct, reliability, average variance extracted, descriptive statistics, loadings, t-values (n = 444)
CR composite reliability, α Cronbach’s alpha, AVE average variance extracted, M mean, SD standard deviation
# Based on 10,000 bootstrapping samples: ***significant at p < 0.001 (two-tailed test)





The buying company enjoys more power in our relationship 
owing to my small sales volume
5.38 1.43 0.816 28.385***
The buying company enjoys more power in our relationship 
because the volume percentage supplied is small
5.50 1.36 0.903 68.690***
The buying company enjoys more power in our relationship 
because my cash bonus percentage is small
5.47 1.44 0.816 31.346***
Overall, this buying firm has more power than my farm busi-
ness





The buying company often pays less cash for the supplied 
cocoa beans
4.38 1.92 0.878 59.082***
The buying company often pays less cash bonus than I 
deserve
4.62 1.89 0.925 76.581***
The buying company often undervalues my cocoa beans 4.68 1.94 0.903 72.195***
The buying company often underrates the quality of my 
cocoa beans
4.31 1.93 0.904 71.480***
The buying company often neglects to correct sales’ errors in 
my transactions
4.41 1.86 0.912 82.731***
The buying company often weighs my cocoa beans as less 
than their actual weight
4.58 1.86 0.882 58.423***
Overall, the buying company often pays less cash bonus than 
I deserve
5.60 1.92 0.912 86.376***
Supplier financial performance CR = 0.93
α = 0.89
AVE = 0.82
Compared to other farm businesses ,my farm business has 
performed relatively well during the last six months in the 
following respects
Profitability 4.67 1.48 0.917 100.236***
Return on investment 4.78 1.45 0.925 105.192***
Debt repayment 4.83 1.47 0.870 43.712***
Economic satisfaction CR = 0.93 α = 0.90 
AVE = 0.72
My relationship with this buying company has been very 
beneficial to my farm enterprise
5.39 1.32 0.783 27.365***
My relationship with this buying company is very attractive 
concerning prompt payment of cash bonuses
5.34 1.44 0.881 60.071***
I am very pleased with my decision to sell to this buyer due 
to the financial benefits in the form of soft loans
5.27 1.45 0.896 81.205***
I would recommend that other farmers sell their products to 
this buying company to benefit financially
5.13 1.46 0.886 87.448***
I am always very satisfied with the amount of cash bonus paid 
to me by this buying company





I have a favourable relationship with this buying company’s 
personnel
4.76 1.49 0.849 45.231***
I am satisfied with dealing with this buying company 4.75 1.58 0.904 82.119***
I would always continue selling to this buying company 
because of the good personal relationship I have with the 
staff
4.67 1.62 0.926 127.786***
This buying company is good to do business with 4.65 1.65 0.918 109.815***
I am always pleased to deal with this buying company 4.71 1.61 0.910 100.417***
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to improve measurement of the power imbalance through 
reformulation of the two additional questions from study 1. 
Reliability results of studies 1 and 2 show the power imbal-
ance scales had high internal consistency and extracted more 
than 50% of the variance in each instance (see Tables 1 and 
2). Membership of cooperatives in study 2 was measured 
with the question ‘are you a member of any cooperative 
farmers association?’ with responses coded as a dummy, 
1 for ‘yes’ and 0 for ‘no’. Opportunism items were adapted 
from John (1984) and Skarmeas et al. (2002). Five items 
were used in study 1, while seven items were used in study 
2 with the same intended purpose of achieving good internal 
consistency. Economic satisfaction items were adapted from 
Geyskens and Steenkamp (2000) and Skinner et al. (1992), 
social satisfaction items from Benton and Maloni (2005) and 
Crosby et al. (1990).
Estimation
We conducted the estimation using the partial least squares 
(PLS) structural equation modelling technique SmartPLS 
3.0 (Ringle et al., 2015). PLS’ strength lies in its ability 
to deal with complex models with a high number of con-
structs, indicators and relationships (Hair et al., 2017). It is 
less strict with assumptions about the distribution of the data 
and equally ideal for small sample size (Chin & Newsted, 
1999; Hair et al., 2017). The use of categorical variables 
with unknown non-normal frequency distribution, which 
are usually negatively skewed, makes PLS preferable. The 
preceding factors make it an ideal analytical technique for 
the current study and hence a preferable alternative to the 
use of maximum likelihood methods.
Results
Descriptive Statistics, Measurement Reliability 
and Validity
The descriptive statistics of the variables (mean and standard 
deviation), factor loadings, reliability, and average variance 
extracted (AVE) of the constructs for study 1 and 2 are pre-
sented in Tables 1 and 2.
The standardized loadings for the indicators and bootstrap 
t-values for all the items used in both study 1 and study 
2 (see Tables 1 and 2) were all significant at 0.001 in the 
two-tailed test, except the item ‘The buying company often 
undervalues my cocoa beans’, which is significant at p < 
0.01 (Table 1). All Cronbach’s alphas exceed the 0.7 thresh-
old (Nunnally, 1978), while composite reliabilities (Fornell 
& Larcker, 1981) are higher than 0.8, showing high internal 
consistency. The average variance extracted (AVE) (Fornell 
& Larcker, 1981) exceeds 0.50, the lowest being 0.52 for the 
construct buyer/agent opportunism in study 1 and the highest 
0.82 for the constructs supplier financial performance (study 
2) and power imbalance (study 1) (see Tables 1 and 2). A 
higher AVE indicates that the variance captured by each 
latent variable is significantly larger than the variance due 
to measurement error, demonstrating unidimensionality and 
high convergent validity of the constructs.
We assessed discriminant validity (Chin, 1998; Fornell & 
Larcker, 1981) by comparing the square root of the AVE for 
each construct with the correlations of all other constructs in 
the model (see Tables 3 and 4). A correlation between con-
structs exceeding the square roots of their AVE indicates that 
they may not be sufficiently discriminable (Coelho & Hense-
ler, 2012; Hair et al., 2017). A comparison of the square root 
of the AVE (bold face diagonal values) and the correlations 
among the constructs shows that the square roots of AVE 
are always higher than the absolute correlations between the 
constructs. We also checked the heterotrait–monotrait ratio 
of correlations and found all the values were under 0.85, 
demonstrating high discriminant validity (Henseler et al., 
2015). We conclude that the measurement models for study 
1 and study 2 show evidence of acceptable validity.
Common Method Variance
Common method bias (CMV) is variance attributable to 
the measurement method rather than to the constructs, this 
is because the data for all the model variables came from 
the same respondents at the same time. CMV might influ-
ence some of the hypothesized relations in the structural 
model (Podsakoff et al., 2003; Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). 
To avoid bias from CMV, we applied an a priori method 
(Hulland et al., 2018). This was done by careful design of the 
questionnaire and formulation of the question instruments. 
During the data collection, we conducted the interviews for 
both studies by asking the questions in a random order: this 
ensured that the dependent and independent variables in the 
survey were separated. Before the administration of both 
surveys, we pre-tested the questionnaire. The pre-test helped 
us avoid ambiguous question items that could be difficult to 
understand or interpret. Taking these steps prior to admin-
istering the survey helped to limit the potential for CMV.
Structural Model Estimation Results
The structural model results of study 1 (n = 105) and study 
2 (n = 444) were estimated using SmartPLS 3 (Ringle et al., 
2015). To evaluate the structural models of both studies, 
we first assessed the structural models for collinearity (Hair 
et al., 2017) by examining the variance inflation factor (VIF) 
values of all the predictor constructs. We found all the VIF 
values to be below the threshold of 3.3 (Diamantopoulos & 
Siguaw, 2006). We concluded that collinearity was not at 
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critical levels (Table 5). Thereafter, we examined the sig-
nificance and relevance of the path coefficients based on the 
results of the bootstrapping procedure with 10,000 subsam-
ples (Franke & Sarstedt, 2019).
Dependence, Power Imbalance, and Financial Performance
Our analysis shows support for the interaction effect between 
supplier dependency and sales volume (H1a: β = 0.45, t = 
2.93, p < 0.01) and hence provides empirical support for the 
moderating effect of transaction volume between supplier 
dependency and power imbalance. In addition, we found 
support for H1b (β = − 0.23, t = 2.49, p < 0.05) and con-
clude that the effect of power imbalance on financial perfor-
mance is moderated by supplier dependency (see Table 5).
Graphical representation of the support for H1a and H1b 
is shown in Figs. 1 and 2. The simple slope analysis of the 
effect of supplier dependency on power imbalance at vari-
ous levels of transaction volume shows that for suppliers of 
large volumes of sales, dependency increases perceptions 
of power imbalance, while for suppliers of small transac-
tion volumes, the opposite applies. Figure 2 illustrate the 
simple slope analysis of the effect of power imbalance on 
supplier financial performance at various levels of supplier 
dependency. Figure 2 shows that at high levels of depend-
ency, power imbalance has a negative effect on financial 
performance.
Switching costs, power imbalance, and opportunism
We did not find support for H2a, which states that switching 
costs are associated with increased power imbalance (H2a: 
β = 0.10, t = 0.95, p > 0.05); however, we found support for 
H2b, which shows that the association between switching 
costs and power imbalance could be curvilinear. Figure 3 
illustrates the quadratic slope analysis of the effect of switch-
ing costs on power imbalance. 
Hypothesis 3a states that power imbalance is associated 
with increased opportunism: in other words, power imbal-
ance is positively associated with opportunism. H3a was 
Table 3  Discriminant validity coefficients (n = 105)
Bold numbers on the diagonals shows the square root of the AVE; numbers below the diagonal represent construct correlations. Single measure 
constructs have an average variance extracted of one, with the assumption that they fully measure the latent variable
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Buyer control of price (1) 1.00
Quality standardization (2) 0.00 0.81
Economic satisfaction (3) 0.16 0.28 0.82
Power imbalance (4) 0.19 − 0.06 − 0.19 0.91
Relationship duration (5) − 0.16 0.14 0.06 − 0.02 1.00
Social satisfaction (6) 0.11 0.30 0.65 0.02 0.11 0.88
Supplier financial performance (7) − 0.16 0.39 0.46 − 0.31 0.04 0.21 0.86
Switching costs (8) 0.04 − 0.40 − 0.22 0.21 − 0.08 − 0.18 − 0.33 1.00
Relative size of buyer (9) 0.08 − 0.15 − 0.15 0.16 − 0.10 − 0.21 − 0.22 0.30 1.00
Sales volume (10) − 0.07 0.51 0.06 − 0.04 0.23 − 0.02 0.23 − 0.12 0.05 1.00
Supplier dependency (11) − 0.13 − 0.15 − 0.02 0.19 0.10 − 0.06 − 0.21 0.38 0.25 0.01 1.00
Buyer/agent opportunism (12) − 0.04 − 0.16 0.32 0.16 0.01 0.27 0.22 0.09 − 0.11 − 0.21 0.04 0.72
Table 4  Discriminant validity 
coefficients (n = 444)
Bold numbers on the diagonals shows the square root of the AVE; numbers below the diagonal repre-
sent construct correlations. Single measure constructs have an average variance extracted of one, with the 
assumption that they fully measure the latent variable
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Economic satisfaction (1) 0.85
Power imbalance (2) 0.02 0.83
Relationship duration (3) 0.17 − 0.02 1.00
Social satisfaction (4) 0.61 − 0.11 0.09 0.90
Supplier financial performance (5) 0.36 − 0.31 0.30 0.33 0.90
Sales volume (6) 0.20 − 0.04 0.30 0.27 0.64 1.00
Buyer/agent opportunism (7) 0.27 0.18 0.02 0.29 0.04 0.05 0.90
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Table 5  Structural model results, effect sizes (f2) and collinearity (VIF) (n = 105)
a Significant at p < 0.10 (one-tailed test)
b Significant at p < 0.05 (one-tailed test)
c R2 values are negligible
# Based on 5000 bootstrapping samples: ***significant at p < 0.001 level (two-tailed test); **significant at p < 0.01 (two-tailed test); *significant 
at p < 0.05 (two-tailed test)
Criterion R2 Predictors Path coefficient t-values# f2 VIF
Power imbalance 0.17 Switching costs 0.10 0.95 0.01 1.36
Supplier dependency − 0.04 0.39 0.00 1.50
Relationship duration 0.09 1.13 0.01 1.22
Sales volume − 0.07 0.64 0.01 1.16
Relative size of buyer 0.16 1.63a 0.02 1.26
Supplier dependency × sales volume 0.45 2.93** 0.10 1.40
Switching costs × switching costs 0.17 2.52* 0.06 1.50
Buyer/agent opportunism 0.17 Power imbalance − 0.17 1.01 0.02 1.83
Power imbalance × power imbalance − 0.28 3.71*** 0.17 1.83
Supplier financial performance 0.54 Power imbalance − 0.24 2.65** 0.09 1.41
Buyer/agent opportunism 0.07 0.75 0.01 1.62
Quality standardization 0.28 2.76** 0.13 1.40
Buyer control of price − 0.18 2.69** 0.06 1.21
Economic satisfaction 0.43 3.49*** 0.17 2.32
Social satisfaction − 0.05 0.46 0.00 2.12
Supplier dependency − 0.12 1.57a 0.02 1.40
Switching costs 0.08 0.92 0.01 1.69
Power imbalance × supplier dependency − 0.23 2.49* 0.06 1.38
Power imbalance × quality standardization 0.27 3.17** 0.14 1.33
Quality  standardizationc Power imbalance − 0.06 0.49 0.00 1.00
Buyer control of  pricec Power imbalance 0.19 2.24* 0.04 1.00
Economic  satisfactionc Power imbalance − 0.18 1.92b 0.03 1.00
Social  satisfactionc Power imbalance 0.03 0.22 0.00 1.00
Fig. 1  Simple slope analysis of 
the effect of supplier depend-
ency on power imbalance at 
various levels of sales volume
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supported by study 2 (see Table 6). Furthermore, our results 
from study 1 (see Table 5) provide support for H3b, which 
posits that the association between power imbalance and 
opportunism could be curvilinear (β = − 0.28, t = 3.71, p < 
0.001). Figure 4 shows the inverted U-shaped curve which 
illustrates that the effect of power imbalance on opportunism 
increases to a point and then decreases.
Financial Consequences of Power Imbalance 
and Opportunism
The objective behind the statement of the three hypoth-
eses H4a, H4b and H4c is to explore the consequences of 
power imbalance and opportunism. H4a states that power 
imbalance is associated with reduced financial perfor-
mance. We found support for H4a (β = − 0.24, t = 2.65, 
p < 0.01) (Table 5). H4b states that the effect of power 
imbalance on reducing financial performance is stronger 
for non-cooperative members than for cooperative mem-
bers. To test H4b, we conducted a multigroup analysis 
based on data from study 2. The results of the multigroup 
analysis (Table 6) showed significant differences (β1 - β2 
= 0.40, p < 0.001) between both groups, such that the 
effect of power imbalance on reducing financial perfor-
mance is stronger for the non-cooperative members (β = 
− 0.15, p < 0.01) than for cooperative members (β = 0.25, 
p < 0.01). Concerning H4c, buyer/agent opportunism was 
found to be associated with reduced supplier financial per-
formance (β = − 0.08, t = 1.64, p < 0.05) (Table 6).
Fig. 2  Simple slope analysis 
of the effect of power imbal-
ance on supplier financial 
performance at various levels of 
supplier dependency
Fig. 3  Linear and quadratic 
slope analysis of the effect 
of switching costs on power 
imbalance
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Financial Consequences of Buyer Control of Price 
and Quality Standardization
From our analysis (Table 5), we found that power imbalance 
increased price control by the power source (β = 0.19, t = 
2.24, p < 0.05). We suggest that buyer control of price is 
associated with reduced financial performance (H5a), while 
buyer control of quality in terms of quality standardization 
is associated with higher financial performance (H5b). 
We found support for both H5a (β = − 0.18, t = 2.69, p < 
0.01) and H5b (β = 0.28, t = 2.76, p < 0.01). For H5c, we 
hypothesized that the effect of power imbalance on financial 
performance is moderated by quality standardization. The 
objective behind H5c was to determine the role played by 
decision control in the association between imbalance in 
power and reward. Our analysis shows that decision control 
regarding quality standardization can enhance the coordi-
native role of power in improving performance. Hence, we 
found support for H5c (β = 0.27, t = 3.17, p < 0.01) (see 
Table 5). We illustrate the test for H5c with a simple slope 
analysis, as shown in Fig. 5. At low levels of quality stand-
ardization, power imbalance reduces financial performance.
Table 6  Structural model results and t-statistic for multigroup analysis
# Based on 10,000 bootstrapping samples: ***significant at p < 0.001 level (two-tailed test); **significant at p < 0.01 (two-tailed test); *signifi-
cant at p < 0.05 (two-tailed test)
a Significant at p < 0.05 (one-tailed test)






β1 − β2 t-value







Power imbalance Relationship duration 0.03 0.60 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.27 0.01 0.10
Sales volume − 0.19 3.92*** − 0.04 0.65 0.11 1.10 0.15 1.34
Buyer/agent opportun-
ism
Power imbalance 0.18 4.50*** 0.17 3.23** 0.19 2.78** 0.03 0.31
Supplier financial per-
formance
Power imbalance − 0.03 0.64 − 0.15 3.21** 0.25 2.74** 0.40 4.37***
Buyer/agent opportun-
ism
− 0.08 1.64a − 0.06 1.01 − 0.13 1.47 0.07 0.68
Economic satisfaction 0.26 4.66*** 0.37 5.71*** 0.09 0.92 0.27 2.37*
Social satisfaction 0.20 3.46*** 0.10 1.36 0.32 3.58*** 0.22 1.82
Economic satisfaction Power imbalance 0.02 0.32 0.07 0.96 − 0.07 0.62 0.14 1.07
Social satisfaction Power imbalance − 0.11 2.33* − 0.11 1.67a − 0.09 0.89 0.02 0.18
Fig. 4  Linear and quadratic 
slope analysis of the effect of 
power imbalance on buyer/agent 
opportunism
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Linking Psychosocial Satisfaction and Collective Action 
with Reward
From our analysis (Table 5), we found that power imbal-
ance decreased economic satisfaction (β = − 0.18, t = 
1.92, p < 0.05). We propose that economic satisfaction 
is associated with increased financial performance (H6a) 
and suggest that the effect of economic satisfaction on 
financial performance is stronger for cooperative mem-
bers than for non-cooperative members (H6b). We found 
support for the positive effect of economic satisfaction 
on financial performance (β = 0.43, t = 3.49, p < 0.001) 
(Table 5). The multigroup analysis, however, does not 
support H6b. Though we found significant differences 
(β1 − β2 = 0.27, p < 0.05) between the two groups, the 
effect of economic satisfaction on financial performance 
was found to be stronger for non-cooperative members (n 
= 301, β = 0.37, p < 0.001) than for cooperative members 
(n = 143, β = 0.09, p > 0.05) (Table 6).
Discussion
Understanding how power asymmetry can provide a 
conducive environment for unethical behaviours is 
important in managing buyer–seller relationships in 
contemporary supply chains. Suppliers in captive agri-
food supplier–buyer exchange relationships are highly 
dependent on buyers while having limited alternative out-
bound supply/marketing options. These suppliers are also 
exposed to performance risk and exploitation (Dadzie 
et al., 2018). We highlight the theoretical contributions 
and managerial implications of the study.
Theoretical Contributions
Though a substantial number of studies have looked at the 
role of power and dependency in business exchanges and 
relationships, the role that power and dependency play in 
the dark side phenomenon is less understood. This implies 
that the mechanisms of the dark side phenomenon are not 
fully explained, and therefore our knowledge of these nega-
tive business practices is still insufficient. Our study pre-
sents several contributions to fill the knowledge gap. The 
study provides empirical evidence of the moderating role of 
transaction volume between supplier dependency and power 
imbalance consistent with the literature (Anderson & Weitz, 
1989; Geyskens et al., 1996). Besides, our findings show that 
asymmetric power relations have a negative impact on the 
gains of the other party in the exchange and this is further 
exacerbated by dependency. This is particularly true when 
there are few alternatives for the dependent partner, such 
that the relationship becomes a captive one and prone to 
exploitation, consistent with the literature.
The effect of switching costs in such captive relationships 
is equally acknowledged in the literature, highly cited as 
the cause and most often assumed to be a linear relation-
ship. Our contribution to the literature shows switching costs 
impact in imbalanced business relationships to be curvilin-
ear. Similarly, the association between power imbalance and 
opportunism has been much cited (e.g. Grandinetti, 2017; 
Hawkins et al., 2008; Tangpong et al., 2015), but with little 
evidence on whether this association is linear or curvilinear. 
Our study reaffirms the linear association and shows that 
the effect of power imbalance on opportunism could also 
be curvilinear.
The study also provides empirical evidence to show the 
consequences of the dark side phenomenon. Power imbal-
ance is associated with reduced financial performance of 
Fig. 5  Simple slope analysis 
of the effect of power imbal-
ance on supplier financial 
performance at various levels of 
quality standardization
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the weaker partner (Chicksand, 2015; Griffith et al., 2006; 
Hingley, 2005a). The concept of collective action refers to 
an action taken by a group of people with the aim to achieve 
a common goal and to improve their social or economic 
situation. Collection action is differentiated by a group/joint 
action and decision instead of that of an individual. Coopera-
tive supply and marketing associations are typical examples. 
Our findings show significant differences between coopera-
tive and non-cooperative groups in relation to the impact of 
power imbalance on financial performance. The theoretical 
implication is that the negative impact of the dark side phe-
nomenon could be averted to a greater extent with group/
joint action and concerted effort.
Managerial Implications
Based on the research context, the cocoa agri-food sup-
ply market, the suppliers are heavily dependent on buyers 
and their agents. The impact of dependency on the power 
imbalance was found to be contingent on transaction vol-
ume, while the effect of power imbalance on financial per-
formance was found to be moderated by supplier depend-
ency. The implication is that small suppliers’ participation 
in collective action through supply and marketing coopera-
tives can help offset the asymmetrical power relations and 
improve individual and group welfare (Fischer & Qaim, 
2012, 2014). Power can be used to control rewards to dis-
advantage the other party in the exchange; however, group 
action can provide a powerful voice for such disappoint-
ing incidents, relationship problems, and problematic busi-
ness relationships. Collective action is a constructive group 
effort to change objectionable relationship conditions with 
the intent to improve conditions.
We draw on Dabholkar et al. (1994, p. 133), ’the interac-
tions through which the terms of exchange are worked out 
are often referred to as the negotiation process’. Using the 
theory of negotiation (bargaining) behaviour (Clopton, 1984; 
Dabholkar et al., 1994; Perdue et al. 1986; Pruitt, 1981), 
negotiation behaviour can be classified along two dimen-
sions of ’’time’’ and ’’gain’’ perspectives. Four categories of 
negotiation behaviour are identified: competitive, command, 
coordinative and cooperative. However, the terms ’’coopera-
tive’’ and ’’coordinative’’ are used interchangeably in the 
literature. Competitive negotiation behaviour emphasizes 
individual short-term gain where parties maximize their 
outcomes. Command behaviour seeks out to maximize indi-
vidual gain; however, the specific strategies are less ’coer-
cive’ than competitive bargaining behaviour.
Coordinative strategies focus on the long-term joint gain, 
while the cooperative approach is characterized by the short-
term joint gain (Dabholkar et al., 1994). Though the above-
negotiating strategies apply mostly to dyadic exchanges, it 
can also apply to network relations although more complex. 
Exchange relations between cocoa suppliers and lead firms 
can be classified along the two dimensions of short/long-
term and individual/joint gain. Individual cocoa farmers 
dealing with lead firms and the government parastatal organ-
ization (Ghana Cocoa Board) have less bargaining power 
than if organized as cooperatives.
An important strategy for protecting firms from unethi-
cal behaviour is information sharing (Eckerd & Hill, 2012). 
The sharing of records and accounts to reduce the informa-
tion asymmetry between buyer and supplier firm can help 
stimulate trust. This action is a critical obligation as emerg-
ing markets liberalize their agri-food supply markets and 
exporters compete for market share for cocoa and coffee in 
the originating countries (Dadzie et al., 2018). Others have 
recommended accredited ethical purchasing agents (Bux-
ton & Vorley, 2012), where lead firms dealing with small 
suppliers can educate, train and align the objectives, incen-
tives and motivations of their sourcing managers, frontline 
staff and intermediaries to be ethical with suppliers (Vorley 
& Thorpe, 2014). Building ethical and mutually beneficial 
relationships between small dependent suppliers and lead 
firms is an important strategy to reduce the negative conse-
quences of exploitative business relationships and to control 
opportunism (Glavee-Geo et al., 2020).
Corporate ethical values (CEV) and formal ethical infra-
structure are key features of an organization that can be 
relied on to ensure employees’ attitudinal and behavioural 
change. This calls for clear ethically responsible purchasing 
practices, codes of conduct, and enforceable company poli-
cies (Saini, 2010). However, ethical codes are not enough. 
Hyman et al. (1990) suggests the need for a checklist for 
evaluating managerial decisions, and to improve the chances 
of being ethical. CEVs represent the amount of attention 
afforded to ethical issues by the firm, and the degree to 
which the firm behaves ethically (Hunt et al., 1989). A firm’s 
formal ethical infrastructure (FEI) is characterized by formal 
communication, recurrent communication, formal surveil-
lance, and formal sanctions and has been found to influence 
employee’s moral awareness (Hawkins et al., 2013; Rottig 
et al., 2011). The ethical infrastructure of an organization 
includes a range of organizational systems that guide ethical 
decision-making (Hawkins et al., 2013). Hence the commu-
nication of ethical standards to employees engenders moral 
behaviour (Eckerd and Hill, 2012).
Laudable as some of the strategies may be, more so 
when most of the initiatives are at the lead firm’s benev-
olence, the challenge is how can resistant lead firms be 
convinced? Global supply chains have become overly 
complex and more vulnerable to disruptions with large 
unanticipated consequences (Fahimnia et al., 2015). Also, 
notwithstanding major disruptions either human-made or 
natural (e.g. COVID-19) and supply risk caused by sev-
eral sources of inherent uncertainties such as demand 
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fluctuations, supply capacity changes, lead time variabil-
ity, and exchange rate volatility (Fahimnia et al., 2015), 
firms face enormous pressure and responsibility to deliver 
consistently. The need to ensure consistent supply and be 
resilient implies that firms have no choice than to be ‘com-
pliant’, socially responsible and enforce ethical behaviour 
among employees (sourcing and purchasing agents, inter-
mediaries, and staff).
Supplier scarcity has been cited (Schiele et al., 2012) as 
an important reason for supplier resource mobilization and 
supplier development. Firms compete not only on the sales 
market but also on the supply market since ‘really good’ 
suppliers are scarce (Cordón & Vollmann, 2008; Schiele 
et al., 2012, p. 1178). Suppliers can actively differentiate 
among competing buyers based on their ethical standards 
such that ethical behaviour can be a differentiating attribute 
and cue. Thus, corporate ethical values can be used as a ‘dis-
criminating’ signal to communicate a firm’s attractiveness 
to suppliers and beat competing buyers (especially regard-
ing strategic products/services). ‘Since more and more sales 
revenue comes from purchased items, it becomes more criti-
cal to get the best—ahead of your competitors’ (Cordón & 
Vollmann, 2008, p. 14). Being ethical is being ‘smart’. The 
behaviours and activities (regarding ethicality) of the buy-
ing company become a key means of influencing suppliers’ 
resource mobilization. It is also a means of communicating 
the firm’s corporate reputation to other stakeholders (gov-
ernment agencies, customers, civil society organizations, 
and the wider public) and reinforcing the firm’s social 
responsibility. Besides, unethical opportunistic behaviour 
can also be a costly problem within the organization and 
lead to substantial inefficiencies and reputational challenges.
The dark side phenomenon leads to challenges that 
inhibit creativity, innovation, and value creation (Abosag 
et al., 2016, p. 5). Value formation is not only associated 
with value co-creation but also with value co-destruction 
(Echeverri & Skålén, 2011). The co-destruction of value 
is one of the downsides of value co-creation, and this has 
ethical implications for business relations. Besides, power 
imbalance impedes supply chain innovation and improve-
ment by the less dominant partner. Such a power imbalance 
can lead to the use of coercive power by the more dominant 
buyer. Small suppliers must devote more resources to ensur-
ing the continuation of business relationships with powerful 
buyers at the expense of supply chain innovations (Matanda 
et al., 2016). Our study suggests that buyer control of price is 
associated with reduced financial performance, while buyer 
control of quality in terms of quality standardization is asso-
ciated with higher financial performance. In addition, we 
found that decision control regarding quality standardization 
can enhance the coordinative role of power in improving 
performance. The implication is that the use of power for 
coordination can be more effective if this is done within an 
environment characterized by mutuality, honesty, empathy, 
and fairness (Woiceshyn, 2011).
Finally, the positive impact of economic satisfaction on 
financial performance was found to be stronger for non-
cooperative members than for cooperative members. This 
could be explained by the fact that cooperative members 
expect more gains from their exchanges than non-coopera-
tive members. Cooperative members invest more time and 
effort in collective action. The implication is that although 
collective action may not solve all challenges emanating 
from problematic business relationships, joint/collective 
action is one of the most viable options in opposition to the 
negative impact of the dark side. For example, fair trade 
initiatives that strive for more equitable sharing of profits 
among the members are typical examples of sustainable col-
laborative supply chains (Drake and Schlachter, 2008).
Conclusion, Limitations, and Further 
Research
Our research highlights the following:
• How dependency and high switching costs in captive 
supplier–buyer exchanges influence perceptions of power 
imbalance.
• The conditions under which power imbalance provides 
ideal situations for unethical behaviours.
• The consequences of power imbalance, opportunistic 
behaviour, and decision control.
• The theoretical contributions and managerial implica-
tions.
Dependency and high switching costs in captive sup-
plier–buyer exchanges influence perceptions of power imbal-
ance. The impact of dependency on power imbalance is con-
tingent on transaction volume, such that as the volume of 
transactions between trading partners increases, dependency 
leads to power imbalance. This eventually leads to opportu-
nities for exploitation of the weaker partner.
Our study has provided empirical evidence of the unique 
relationships between the main constructs under study (see 
Table 7) and discussed the theoretical contributions of the 
study, briefly summarized into five main propositions as fol-
lows. (1) Asymmetric power relations’ negative impact on 
the gains of the other party in the exchange is exacerbated 
by dependency. (2) The consequences of power imbalance 
are opportunism and low financial reward. (3) The effect 
of power imbalance on opportunism is not only linear but 
could also be curvilinear. (4) The negative impact of power 
imbalance in reducing financial performance is exacerbated 
without joint effort and collective action. (5) Not only does 
decision control in asymmetric relations lead to the unfair 
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distribution of rewards, but it also provides the conditions 
for exploitation and unethical behaviour. We have also pro-
vided managerial insights in relation to control, monitoring, 
collective action, fairness, transparency, ethical sourcing/
purchasing and chain governance. We emphasize the need 
for businesses to invest in strategies and procedures that pro-
tect suppliers against detrimental actions and behaviours by 
boundary spanning personnel and intermediaries.
We acknowledge some limitations of this study, which 
can be addressed in future research. Firstly, we considered 
the suppliers’ perspective, which is just one side of the 
buyer–supplier dyad; however, perceptions may vary across 
the dyad (John & Reve, 1982), such that suppliers and buyers 
may have different perceptions and interpretations of what 
goes on in the dyad. Thus, future research could focus on the 
interdependent and simultaneously interacting perspectives 
of suppliers and buyers. Secondly, this study investigated 
power asymmetry using the cocoa industry in a developing 
economy as the setting. Hence, the findings may not apply to 
all industries. However, the results can be extended to indus-
tries with similar power relations such as the agribusiness 
(coffee, tea, horticulture—fruits, vegetables, floral), textiles 
and garment industries, and the grocery/retail sectors. Some 
of the cooperative associations studied in this article may 
vary regarding buyer–supplier relations in industrial settings 
in the developed economies due to institutional differences. 
Further replication studies involving small to medium-sized 
supply companies in asymmetrical industrial supplier–buyer 
relationships in developed economies will help provide more 
support and confirmation of the various hypothesized asso-
ciations in the present study.
Thirdly, the research context and setting’s findings 
assume homogenous outcomes, benefits, and impact for all 
cooperative members. Our study did not take into consid-
eration the number of cooperative associations. Hence, we 
were not able to explore if the findings relating to the nega-
tive impact of power imbalance on financial performance 
and the positive effect of economic satisfaction on financial 
performance differs across the many cooperatives. Future 
studies should consider how the impact of power imbal-
ance on financial performance as well as the positive effect 
of economic satisfaction on financial performance differs 
Table 7  Summary of findings
Ncoop non-cooperative membership of supplier, Coop cooperative membership of supplier
Associations Uniqueness of hypothesized association Sign Results
Key antecedents of power imbalance (shadow of dark 
side)
 Supplier dependency → Power imbalance (H1a) Moderated by transaction volume + Strongly supported
 Switching costs → Power imbalance (H2a) Direct effect and linear + Not supported
 Switching costs → Power imbalance (H2b) Curvilinear (U shape) + Supported
Consequences of power imbalance (negative—dark 
side)
 Power imbalance → Financial performance (H1b) Moderated by supplier dependency − Supported
 Power imbalance → Buyer/agent opportunism (H3a) Direct effect and linear + Supported
 Power imbalance → Buyer/agent opportunism (H3b) Curvilinear (inverted U shape) − Strongly supported
 Power imbalance → Financial performance (H4a) Direct effect and linear − Supported
 Power imbalance → Financial performance (H4b) Moderated by cooperative/collective action − Ncoop>Coop—strongly supported
Consequences of opportunism (negative—dark side)
 Buyer/agent opportunism → Financial performance 
(H4c)
Direct effect and linear − Supported
Negative consequences of decision control (negative—
dark side)
 Buyer control of price → Financial performance (H5a) Direct effect and linear − Supported
Positive consequences of decision control (positive—
dark side)
 Quality standardization → Financial performance 
(H5b)
Direct effect and linear + Strongly supported
 Power imbalance → Financial performance (H5c) Moderated by quality standardization + Strongly supported
Positive consequences of economic satisfaction (posi-
tive—light side)
 Economic satisfaction → Financial performance (H6a) Direct effect and linear + Strongly supported
 Economic satisfaction → Financial performance (H6b) Moderated by cooperative/collective action + Coop>Ncoop—not supported
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across the many cooperatives and its corresponding ethical 
considerations.
Besides, we did not explore the motivations and expec-
tations about cooperative membership or why some farm 
enterprises did not join the cooperatives. This provides more 
options for future research about the motivations and expec-
tations of cooperative membership and its impact on value 
creation and co-destruction. In addition, power, dependence, 
and exploitation can occur in cooperative relationships and 
joint actions even among suppliers. Conflict and power 
dependence can occur in cooperatives.
Our study focused on joint action as one of the possible 
solutions to address exploitation. Collective action is one 
of the strategies to tackle this ethical problem. However, 
other viable options have not been considered in the present 
study, presenting future research opportunities. Finally, the 
paper addressed the supplier–buyer perspective and not the 
buyer–supplier or supplier–supplier exchanges and perspec-
tives. Thus, there is a need for more studies from other per-
spectives apart from the suppliers. Future studies on power, 
dependence and exploitation in joint/collaborative actions 
can present new insights on the dark side phenomenon.
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